The theory and practice of interconnected third-party conflict resolution :
[Thesis]
Jones, Bruce David.
explaining the failure of the peace process in Rwanda, 1990-1994.
London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London)
2000
Ph.D.
London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London)
2000
New approaches to third-party conflict resolution stress the significance of the interconnectionsbetween the interventions of various external actors. Recent empirical and policy-onented work oncivil wars underscores the recurrent policy challenges such external actors face in peace processes.Taken together, the two bodies of work provide a framework for assessing the impact of internationalconflict resolution efforts.The thesis explores the connections between different third-party conflict resolution efforts thataccompanied the Rwandan civil war, from 1990 to 1994, and assesses the individual and collectiveimpact they had on the course of that conflict. Empirical chapters, arranged chronologically, reviewpre-negotiation efforts, mediation processes, and both diplomatic and peacekeeping efforts to securethe implementation of a peace agreement signed in August 1993. This review considers official andunofficial efforts by both state and non-state actors.Applying the framework to the empirical material, the thesis explores a seeming paradox: that thegenocide that engulfed Rwanda in 1994 was preceded by a wide range of international efforts tocontain and manage what started off as a small-scale civil war. The thesis dispels the conventionalwisdom that nothing was done to prevent the genocide in Rwanda. Rather, it provides empirical andtheoretical evidence that the failure of the peace process was not a function of the weakness of anyone third-party effort, but of the paucity of the connections between them. In so doing, the thesisgenerates further insights into the critical role-and current weakness-of co-ordinating elements inpeace processes.The thesis then highlights the theoretical implications of the case study. First, it confirms thesignificance of interconnections between third-party interventions, and adds detail as to the variouspositive and negative forms those interconnections may take. Second, it highlights the fact thatrecurrent obstacles to conflict resolution in civil wars may arise not only from the nature of the warsthemselves, but also from the nature of third-party intervenors. Thus, it suggests a shift in emphasisboth for empirical and theoretical investigation onto intervening actors, and in particular the systemsand processes that co-ordinate and organise their efforts-or fail to do so. The central arguments ofthe thesis serve as a cautionary tale about the limits of third-party conflict resolutrnn, and as anargument for systematic reform of the international system for managing third-party interventions.
Genocide; War; Peacekeeping; United Nations
Jones, Bruce David.
London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London)