Prolegomenon : Husserl's turn to history and pure phenomenology -- Plato's and Aristotle's theory of eidغe. Plato's Socratic theory of eidغe : the first pillar of the ancient precendent to pure phenomenology ; Plato's arithmological theory of eidغe : the second pillar of the ancient precedent to pure phenomenology ; Aristotle's criticism of Plato's theory of eidغe : the third (and final) pillar of the ancient precedent to pure phenomenology -- From descriptive psychology to transcendentally pure phenomenology. Origin of the task of pure phenomenology ; Pure phenomenology and Platonism ; Pure phenomenology as the transcendental-phenomenological investigation of absolute consciousness ; Transcendental phenomenology of absolute consciousness and phenomenological philosophy ; Limits of the transcendental-phenomenological investigation of pure consciousness -- From the phenomenology of transcendental consciousness to that of monadological intersubjectivity. Phenomenological philosophy as transcendental idealism ; The intersubjective foundation of transcendental idealism : the immanent transcendency of the world's objectivity -- From monadological intersubjectivity to the historical a priori constitutive of all meaning. The pure phenomenology motivation of Husserl's turn to history ; The essential connection between intentional history and actual history ; The historicity of both the intelligibility of ideal meanings and the possibility of actual history ; Desedimentation and the link between intentional history and the constitution of a historical tradition ; Transcendental phenomenology as the only true explanation of objectivity and all meaningful problems in previous philosophy -- The unwarranted historical presuppositions guiding the fundamental ontological and deconstructive criticisms of transcendental philosophy. The methodological presupposition of the ontico-ontological critique of intentionality : Plato's Socratic seeing of the eidغe ; The mereological presupposition of fundamental ontology : that being as a whole has meaning overall ; The presupposition behind the proto-deconstructive critique of intentional historicity : the conflation of intrasubjective and intersubjective idealities ; The presupposition behind the deconstruction of phenomenology : the subordination of being to speech -- Epilogue : transcendental-phenomenological criticism of the criticism of phenomenological cognition -- Coda : phenomenological self-responsibility and the singularity of transcendental philosophy.