عنوان

Epistemic justification /

شابک

019152946X

شابک

0191598526

شابک

0199243786

شابک

0199243794

شابک

1281944114

شابک

6611944117

شابک

9780191529467

شابک

9780191598524

شابک

9780199243785

شابک

9780199243792

شابک

9781281944115

شابک

9786611944117

شماره

b786690

عنوان اصلي

Epistemic justification /

نام عام مواد

[Book]

نام نخستين پديدآور

Richard Swinburne.

محل نشرو پخش و غیره

New York :

نام ناشر، پخش کننده و غيره

Oxford University Press,

تاریخ نشرو بخش و غیره

2001.

نام خاص و کميت اثر

1 online resource (vi, 262 pages)

متن يادداشت

Includes bibliographical references and index.

متن يادداشت

Theories of synchronic justification -- Belief -- Probability -- The criteria of logical probability -- Basicality -- The value of synchronic justification -- The value of diachronic justification -- Knowledge.

بدون عنوان

0

متن يادداشت

Modern disputes about what makes a belief epistemically justified or rational are flawed through failing to recognize that there are different kinds of justifications that are in different ways indicative that the belief is true. I distinguish synchronic justification (the belief being a justified response to the believer's situation at the time) from diachronic justification (the belief constituting a justified response to adequate investigation over time); and, for each of these kinds, internalist justification (justification by introspectible factors) from externalist justification (justification by factors not necessarily accessible to the believer). A belief is internally synchronically justified if it is rendered inductively probable by the believer's basic beliefs; but 'inductively probable' may mean probable by true a priori standards (logically probable), by true standards to the best of the believer's ability to discover this (epistemically probable), or simply by the believer's own standards (subjectively probable). External synchronic justification is normally a matter of being produced by a reliable process, and there are many different ways of spelling that out. A belief is diachronically justified to the extent to which it results from adequate investigation. This depends (positively) on how probable it was that investigation would lead to evidence that would make a difference to the original probability of the belief; how probable it was that the issue was important; and (negatively) on how probable it was that investigation would cost much time and money. But all these 'probabilities' can be spelled out in different internalist and externalist ways. Almost all these kinds of justification are worth having, because it is logically probable that a belief justified in almost all these ways will be true. This account of justification is extended to give an account of different kinds of knowledge, all of which are worth having.

عنوان

Epistemic justification.

شماره استاندارد بين المللي کتاب و موسيقي

0199243786

موضوع مستند نشده

Justification (Theory of knowledge)

موضوع مستند نشده

Justification (Théorie de la connaissance)

موضوع مستند نشده

Justification (Theory of knowledge)

موضوع مستند نشده

Kennistheorie.

موضوع مستند نشده

PHILOSOPHY-- Epistemology.

موضوع مستند نشده

Rechtvaardiging.

موضوع مستند نشده

PHI-- 004000

شماره

ويراست

شماره رده

نشانه اثر

مستند نام اشخاص تاييد نشده

Swinburne, Richard.

مستند نام تنالگان تاييد نشده

Oxford University Press.

تاريخ عمليات

20201207002741.0

قواعد فهرست نويسي ( بخش توصيفي )

pn

نام الکترونيکي

نوع ماده

[Book]

تكميل شده

Y