University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, A Series of Books in Philosophy of Science, Methodology, Epistemology, Logic, History of Science and Related Fields, 26.
CONTENTS NOTE
Text of Note
1 / The Deductive Model of Explanation: A Statement --;1.1. Explanation and Deduction --;1.2. The Humean Account of Laws --;1.3. The Evidential Worth of Law-Assertions --;1.4. That Some Explanations Are Better than Others --;1.5. That Technical Rules of Computation Are Laws --;2 / The Reasonability of the Deductive Model --;2.1. Why Ought the Deductive Model Be Accepted? --;2.2. Are There Reasoned Predictions Which Are Not Explanations? --;2.3. Is Correlation Less Explanatory than Causation? --;2.4. Is Causation Inseparable from Action? --;2.5. Are There Explanations Without Predictions? --;2.6. Explanation and Judgment --;3 / Explanations and Explanings --;3.1. Explanations in the Context of Communication --;3.2. Formalist Criticisms of the Deductive Model --;3.3. Explanations and Explanatory Content --;3.4. Narrative and Integrating Explanations --;3.5. Are Laws Evidence for, or Part of, Explanations? --;3.6. Can We Know Causes Without Knowing Laws? --;Conclusion --;Notes --;Notes to Chapter 1 --;Notes to Chapter 2 --;Notes to Chapter 3 --;Notes to Conclusion --;Name Index.
SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
In recent years, however, this three-fold identity has been challenged: there are, it is argued, causal explanations that are not scientific, scientific explanations that are not deductive, deductions from laws that are neither causal explanations nor scientific explanations, and causal explanations that involve no deductions from laws.