Offprint. Foundations and trends in microeconomics (Online). Vol. 3, no. 3 (2007).
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Title from PDF title page (viewed Jan. 15, 2008).
INTERNAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES/INDEXES NOTE
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Includes bibliographical references.
CONTENTS NOTE
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Abstract -- Introduction and overview -- The demand for social health insurance -- Theory of insurance demand -- The demand for health insurance -- Why social health insurance? -- The supply of health insurance -- Benefit package -- Risk selection effort -- Loading: the true price of insurance -- Vertical restraints/vertical integration -- Market structure -- The design of an optimal health insurance contract -- The limits of social health insurance -- Limits created by regulation -- Limits imposed by the behavior of insurers -- Limits imposed by institutional design -- Limited willingness-to-pay of citizens -- Summary and conclusions -- Formal model of health insurer behavior in terms of innovation and risk selection effort -- Competitive health insurer -- Public monopoly health insurer -- Types and efficiency effects of regulation -- References -- Updates.
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SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
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The objective of this text is to develop the theory of social health insurance (SHI; the expression used especially in the United States is "public health insurance, " which will be viewed as one variant of SHI here). While a good deal is known about the demand and supply of private insurance, the theoretical basis of SHI is much more fragile. Specifically, on the demand side, what are the reasons for social (or public) health insurance to exist, even to dominate private health insurance in most developed countries? With regard to supply, what do we know about the objectives and constraints of SHI managers? Finally, economists can predict properties of the equilibrium characterizing private health insurance (PHI). However, what is the likely outcome ("performance") of SHI? At the normative level, one may ask, should the balance be shifted from SHI to PHI?