عنوان

An epistemic foundation for scientific realism :

شابک

3030022188

شابک

9783030022181

شابک اشتباه

303002217X

شابک اشتباه

9783030022174

عنوان اصلي

An epistemic foundation for scientific realism :

نام عام مواد

[Book]

ساير اطلاعات عنواني

defending realism without inference to the best explanation /

نام نخستين پديدآور

John Wright.

محل نشرو پخش و غیره

Cham, Switzerland :

نام ناشر، پخش کننده و غيره

Springer,

تاریخ نشرو بخش و غیره

[2018]

نام خاص و کميت اثر

1 online resource (viii, 220 pages)

عنوان فروست

Synthese Library ;

مشخصه جلد

volume 402

متن يادداشت

Includes bibliographical references.

متن يادداشت

Introduction : realism and reason -- The skeptical arguments against realism I : inductive skepticism -- The skeptical arguments : 2 -- Realism and inference to the best explanation -- On the inference to unobservables -- Underdetermination and theory preference -- Eddington inferences in science -- 1 : atoms and molecules -- Eddington inferences in science -2 : the size and shape of the universe.

بدون عنوان

0

متن يادداشت

This monograph develops a new way of justifying the claims made by science about phenomenon not directly observable by humans, such as atoms and black holes. It details a way of making inferences to the existence and properties of unobservable entities and states of affairs that can be given a probabilistic justification. The inferences used to establish realist claims are not a form of, and neither do they rely on, inference to the best explanation. Scientific Realism maintains that scientific theories and hypotheses refer to real entities, forces, and relations, even if one cannot examine them. But, there are those who doubt these claims. The author develops a novel way of defending Scientific Realism against a range of influential attacks. He argues that in some cases, at least, we can make probabilistically justifiable inferences from observed data to claims about unobservable, theoretical entities. He shows how this enables us to place some scientific realist claims on a firmer epistemological footing than has previously been the case. This also makes it possible to give a unified set of replies to the most common objections to Scientific Realism. The final chapters apply the developed conceptual apparatus to key cases from the history of science and from recent science. One example concerns realism with respect to atoms. Another looks at inferences from recent astronomical data to conclusions about the size and shape of those parts of the universe lying beyond that which we can observe.

منبع سفارش / آدرس اشتراک

Springer Nature

شماره انبار

com.springer.onix.9783030022181

عنوان

An Epistemic Foundation for Scientific Realism : Defending Realism Without Inference to the Best Explanation.

شماره استاندارد بين المللي کتاب و موسيقي

9783030022174

موضوع مستند نشده

Science-- Methodology.

موضوع مستند نشده

Mathematical physics.

موضوع مستند نشده

Philosophy of science.

موضوع مستند نشده

Quantum & theoretical chemistry.

موضوع مستند نشده

Science-- Methodology.

موضوع مستند نشده

SCIENCE-- Philosophy & Social Aspects.

موضوع مستند نشده

PDA

موضوع مستند نشده

PDA

موضوع مستند نشده

SCI-- 075000

شماره

ويراست

شماره رده

نشانه اثر

مستند نام اشخاص تاييد نشده

Wright, John, (John N.)

تاريخ عمليات

20200823073944.0

قواعد فهرست نويسي ( بخش توصيفي )

pn

نام الکترونيکي

نوع ماده

[Book]

تكميل شده

Y